CSS is a device that imitates a legitimate base station. Police around the world mainly use this technology to locate the phone (and the person who is therefore located) with a high degree of accuracy, or to determine who is in a specific location. There have been reports in the past that advanced CSS can intercept and record content and metadata from phone calls and text messages via 2G networks. However, there is no public method to use cell phone jammer to intercept text messages and calls on 4G networks. Cellular simulators can also disrupt cellular services in specific areas. However, it is difficult to determine whether the government is using CSS, because there are many obvious signs of CSS use-battery exhaustion, service interruption or network degradation-which may occur due to other reasons, such as B. due to cellular network failure.

Intercepting calls and text messages is the most terrifying potential feature of CSS, but it is also the least likely. From what we know, intercepting content is technically impossible, because as far as we know, the content it contains is based on current security investigations (for example, investigations on 2G and LTE/4G networks did not consider any security vulnerabilities or possible Correction that occurred) (in the 5G standard), interception can only be performed when the target is connected via 2G, which makes the target a bit “noisy” and easy for users to identify. In any case, cell phone jammers cannot read the contents of encrypted messages such as Signal, WhatsApp, Wire, Telegram or Keybase.

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